Community, subjectivity and inter-subjectivity

Cite as: Cronick, K. (2002). Community, subjectivity, and inter-subjectivity. American Journal of Community Psychology. 30, 4, 529-546. This web page (http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0091-0562/contents ) contains a table of contents referring to the article.

Abstract: This paper deals with the notions of “subjectivity”, “inter-subjectivity” and “community” from several different points of view that include subjective and inter-subjective agency, a sense of community, the community as a social institution, and the idea of social justice. The context of these considerations can be found in the Community – Social - Psychological approach to social action as it is often practiced in Latin America. A review of these themes is considered important because different models of community intervention and practice may lead to different expressions of community interaction.
KEY WORDS: subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, agency

INTRODUCTION

Community Social Psychology (CSP) can be considered a special branch of Community Psychology. The ideological and theoretical sources of this branch can be found in Fals Borda (1959, 1978, 1979), Montero (1987); Serrano-García, López & Rivera-Medina (1987); Serrano-García & Collazo (1992), Sánchez & Wiesenfeld (1995) among others. As Martín & López (1998) have pointed out, the principal characteristics of CSP are its emphasis on participants’ interrelation within community change projects, their “sense of community”, and the sense of “agency” (or personal control) that is developed through social participation.

Thus, the notions of subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and community occupy the theoretical center of CSP. An examination of the philosophical foundations that underlie community work is important because facilitators need to have an idea of what they can accomplish. This implies a knowledge of what kinds of community are possible, how people imagine themselves to be, how they want to be, how they think their community is, and what they would like it to be. In this way, subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and models for community self-understanding become points on a continuum that describes how people can and do relate to each other. In what follows these issues will be addressed.

This paper is divided into the following sections:

a) Subjectivity and inter-subjectivity: I address the issues of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, especially in terms of the possibility of the development of what may be called an autonomous person. This individual is, nevertheless, the product of his or her community. That is, we are dealing with a subject that occupies “a privileged space between ethical… universality and the singularity of individual experience” (Sawaia, 1998, p. 177). Two different inter-subjective models are discussed: 1) In “Hegel’s slave both the impossibility of isolated individuality and the necessity for personal agency are considered, and 2) In “The social elaboration of subjectivity” the bases for autonomous inter-subjectivity and social action are considered from the points of view of G.H. Mead and Alfred Schütz, among others.

b) Then I will relate these issues to some community models in the section “Inter-subjectivity and community agency”. Social action is thus channeled into three community models: 1) the “sense of community”, 2) the community as an institution considered from the point of view of political liberalism, and 3) the community examined from the perspective of social justice and participation.

SUBJECTIVITY AND INTER-SUBJECTIVITY

We cannot explicitly define subjectivity and inter-subjectivity at the outset. One of our purposes in writing this paper is to explore the meanings of these terms. In what follows we will examine subjectivity as agency (above all), and inter-subjectivity in terms of the two models mentioned above. There have been some efforts to give context to subjectivity and inter-subjectivity from a historical perspective and from the point of view implied by the concept of “possible awareness” (Goldmann, 1988). From the point of view of much of Latin American CSP, the construction of a possible, or “new” subjectivity is an important goal. Goldmann defines possible awareness as “the maximum (subjective and inter-subjective) development that a given group can achieve without changing its essential characteristics” (p. 208). The ideal subject is defined as “active”, as opposed to an “inert receptor of external action” (Montero, 1982, p. 17).


It is important at this point to delimit our use of the term “subject”. We can identify two current meanings for the term in psychology:

a) “Subject” can be used in the sense of “individual”, or the basic unit in a greater category. In this sense the subject is one of a number of objects that can be counted. “Individual” is a term that is useful for distinguishing between the elements of a group and a mass of objects or people. Thus, in a demographic study, “subjects” can refer to the individual people that make up social classes or sex categories. In general, in positivist studies in psychology the “subject” can be considered as the object of study.

b) In approaches such as psychoanalysis, phenomenology, existentialism, and postmodernism, the “subject” is understood to be the source of consciousness and agency. In fact the terms “subject” and “agent” are often synonyms. For this reason the subject is seen as the seat of awareness, will, liberty, reason, and morality. The subject’s existence has been considered the most basic epistemological reality from Descartes and George Berkeley, to modern theorists such as Morín (1994).

In this paper we employ the second meaning of the term. In Latin American CSP the facilitator’s role is seen as the promotion of the subject’s sense of agency (as opposed to passiveness). Lane & Sawaia (1995) define this role as:

“the development of groups that are aware and capable of exercising control over (their lives).... This is achieved through cooperative and organized activities. In this sense, everyday power relationships play an important role.... On the other hand, the achievement of subjectivity implies both people’s understanding of their own world representations and the feelings that define their unique individuality (p. 75).

In order to develop the idea of community it is important to explore the notion of subjectivity and agency. To do this I will consider briefly the following notions: a) Hegel’s slave, and b) the social construction of subjectivity.

Hegel’s slave

Hegel's parable of the Master and the Slave is important for our consideration of the interdependence of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. This interdependence can been seen in the relationship between the self (or Ego) and the Other. Since Hegel’s time, particularly since the writing of the Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807/1977), personal realization can be related to the presence of the Other. We can consider two ways in which Hegel defined awareness:
a) in relation to the idea of personal and collective perfection, and
b) in terms of the inter-subjectivity that arises out of interaction (which in Hegel is marked by domination and submission).

Both of these forms of awareness are the result of a dialectical logic in which Hegel supposes that both reality and thought are distinguished by three states or successive moments, which are traditionally identified as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. This implies a dynamic development of things (ontology) and thinking (epistemology) through the creation and resolution of contradictions, rather than a simple, lineal development.

Many other authors since Hegel's time have dealt with the issue of inter-subjectivity. Notably, Apel (1991, 1986) mentions, as an a priori condition for communication, a community of speakers that are subjected to the same ethical and epistemological rules. This implies an attitude of acceptance of the Other (as a person) on the part of speakers and listeners. Dussel (1999) also refers to an a priori relationship between the self and the Other in terms of the self's responsability. A thorough discussion of modern philosophers' ideas of inter-subjectivity, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Hegel interests us because he juxtaposes two concepts which describe how the Ego and the Other perceive each other: a) being for itself (the way the subject thinks about itself), and b) being for another (as perceived from another point of view).

In what follows I will interpret the parable of the Master and the Slave found in the first chapters of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit. I will make use of both meanings of awareness mentioned above, specifically in relation to personal agency. The general idea of the parable is the achievement of “freedom” from bondage and apathy.

Hegel introduces the notion of a (proto) being called an Ego and develops its relationship to another being that we can call the Other. The relationship unfolds in terms of several different stages of inter-subjective awareness in which the Ego perceives and then interacts with the Other.

First, Hegel imagines an Ego that believes he is the only being that can think. Therefore, when he sees another being, he thinks (being for another) that this second being is unable to think for himself, and also he thinks that this Other deems himself (for himself) to be just a “thing”. This is constitutes an "objectification" of the Other from the Ego's point of view. Thus the Other is perceived by the ego as a non-being. This means that the Other has acquired an identity (being for another) which may be different from what he himself believes himself to be (being for itself).

In what follows, Hegel's parable shows how subjectivity and inter-subjectivity cannot be separated. Each being denies the other’s individuality as such. However, after this initial denial, they have lost the sense of being unique, and thus are sown the seeds of inter-subjectivity. The relationship begins, nevertheless, as one that is limited to domination and submission. The two beings face each other off. The Ego and the Other confront each other in battle, and the Ego wins. One becomes the master and the other the slave. The master makes the slave work for him in an attempt to regain his independence and uniqueness. But now it happens that a great part of the master’s satisfaction comes from the fact the slave also considers him as the only one who can think (being for another). For this reason, the master needs the slave. The master is not quite as independent as he might have wished. He can enjoy being served, but he knows that without the slave’s subservience, he would not be a master. Up to this point, the slave is "only a thing" from the master's point of view, but the master's sense of himself is mediated by what the slave thinks of him.

The slave, on the other hand, experiences “fear and anguish”. He has adopted the master’s belief that he is “only a thing” and serves the master without protest. This self-denial on the slave's part gives another significance to his subservience. On one hand it has confirmed the master's sense of mastery. But also it shows how the slave has assumed his own identity only through the eyes of the Other.

The slave is finally able to liberate himself both because of his fear, and because the product of his work is something permanent. In this way he comes aware of his capacity to make and do things. He finally is able to question the master’s power over him and becomes aware that he doesn’t need the master in order to think. This achievement separates him from the “things”. His first encounter with freedom is difficult, however. He is indecisive first of all and then belligerent. Finally, in the stage of “unhappy awareness” he is able to recognize the contradictions of his existence.

There are several community interpretations that we may make about this parable. I will mention three of them here. First, we can consider the slave’s growing awareness that he is not a “thing”. This means that he has become an agent. He is aware of the ability to think for himself and can characterize himself as a thinking being. Also he is not so dependent on what someone else may think of him. In any of the meanings of community that we will develop below, it is important that members become aware of their capacity to think and act independently.

Another way of looking at the master/slave relationship is in terms of the role of work (community practice) in the formation of subjects. In this case, as in CSP, awareness comes from working together. However, this is not a simple process. People may be alienated from the group process and may not see themselves as participants in a joint endeavor. Also there are destructive behaviors such as complaining about the decisions taken in work-groups without having participated in the discussions about these decisions.

Perhaps the most important contribution that the parable of the Master and the Slave makes to community psychology can be found in the slave’s ability to say “no”. This aspect of subjectivity is often ignored in psychology. The master-slave combination can be considered a metaphor that represents a continuum of psychological states that range from domination to submission, and has been incorporated in work such as that of Seligman (1975) and Rotter (1966). However the categories of experience that have been developed by these authors remain at the level of putting a label on persons and groups (such as “internal” or “external”). The capacity for objecting to the imposition of a subservient role is not often dealt with. It is true that Seligman's work deals with depression, but it takes the form of a passive reaction to the world. In the same way, although locus of control theory has undergone changes, the basic idea of an internal or an external stance in a given situation remains in the theory. People's capacity for growth and evolution are not incorporated in these theoretical notions.

The social elaboration of subjectivity

Authors such as G.H. Mead (1972), Schütz (1932/1993), Berger & Luckmann (1966), and Habermas (1987) have shown how human subjectivity is socially elaborated. One way of describing the fact that isolated subjectivity is impossible is to say that individuals act like subjects because they have access to their lifeworld. I will paraphrase Habermas’ (1987) definition of lifeworld: a provision of interpretative patterns that are culturally transmitted and are organized linguistically. This world is the locale of inter-subjectivity and public debate takes place here. We might say, from this point of view, that the possibility of subjectivity is already elaborated in culture.

G. H. Mead, for example, described the ego as fragmented into different roles or “voices”. This fragmentation is seen as the result of socialization. Mead (1972) says that there are many personalities in each person that “appear” in appropriate contexts. In healthy people, these personalities are unified in a complete structure. Children assume roles in their games, and in this way construct a “generalized other”. In a similar way, adults take on the roles in society that are relevant for the contexts in which they find themselves.

But the individual in Mead is not at the mercy of all the norms that are associated with these roles. He or she can make conscious use of his or her inner voices in order to oppose these norms and produce changes in the original learned patterns. In this sense Mead connects theoretically with Hegel’s slave who was able to reconstruct his awareness in order to defy the master and to think as a free being. Thus Mead describes a subject that is able both to collaborate with, and to oppose socially determined patterns of interaction.

In Alfred Schütz the idea of a constructive subject occurs in relation to the person’s ability for “face - to - face” relationships. Schütz’s subjects make use of a large quantity of shared awareness in order to define the world and act in it intentionally. This world has historical origins and is transmitted through language. The people that Schütz describes have the ability to act inter-subjectively before they actually enter into relationships. The capacity that people have for understanding other people’s intentions is more than the simple perception of movement, sound waves, etc. People “know” that the behavior of others signifies something, and that there is “something behind” (a mind) that is not apparent only on the basis of that behavior. In this sense, Schütz subject has overcome Hegel´s master (who only perceives a “thing” in his fellow being).

This takes us to the idea of social action. It is an idea that combines the concepts of action and significance, and formulates the possibility that an action can be collective. In order for action to be collective, there must be a sense of subjectivity that includes a sense of the inter-subjective. As Hegel and others have pointed out, a person cannot have a complete sense of him or herself without also having some sense of the Other. Hegel’s master’s sense of the slave was limited to his satisfaction at being served and appreciated by his servant. . In Schütz, however, the Other is a fellow person and not an object.

On one hand the Other can be an object of “appropriation, conversion and repression” (Bernstein, 1991). But as Bernstein observes, “I can also recognize another ego in this figure that cannot be reduced to what I believe myself to be” (Bernstein, 1991, p. 19). In this way, the two perceptions developed by Hegel (the being for itself, and the being for another) become enlarged to include the recognition of the Other as someone who is a fellow person. That is, the Other is similar to me (although we may disagree on many issues). Bernstein refers to the tension between the notions of being for itself and being for another -which are the two Hegelian references that interest us here. Bernstein, on the other hand, is talking about an Ego that either recognizes or denies the humanity of the other -as an autonomous being. In another relevant context, Dussel (1999) referred to "Will to Alterity".
That is, the willingness to accept responsability for the "suffering" of the Other.

We have reviewed here two important notions for Community Psychology. Firstly, community inter-subjectivity implies awareness of others and concern for their wellbeing. It is important that community members see each others’ needs as extensions of their own without being identical to them. Secondly, both Hegel´s slave and Mead’s generalized other incorporate the importance of being able to say “no” to unpleasant, destructive realities in order to create new ones. In the models of subjectivity that have been reviewed here, negation has played an important role.

One way of innovating new realities is to create new environments. When a new school is established, or when a community association is founded, then a new basis for subjectivity is prepared. For example, landslide victims in Caracas were able to create a self–help neighborhood association largely because of the presence of some very able natural leaders (Sánchez, Cronick & Wiesenfeld, 1988). They promoted a new way of solving problems. Group members learned to resolve differences through public debate rather than through personal vendettas, and were able to negotiate with local government authorities on an equal basis for the satisfaction of their housing needs. This achievement was related to the learning of new coping skills. What began as helplessness became agency. After this experience, which lasted about five years, community members often valued the feeling of personal and collective agency over their more concrete achievements such as the construction of new homes. The leaders had a very clear idea of what kind of community they desired to develop. They also were able to say “no” to non-productive solutions.


INTER-SUBJECTIVITY AND COMMUNITY AGENCY

The nature of community has been treated in many different ways. Community often implies geographic identification, social interaction and social responsibility (Montero, 1982). On the other hand, Dunham (1977, 1986) has stated that the idea of urban communities should be separated from “place”, because communities may be described as “processes” that also occur in clubs and other groups. In a similar sense, Klein & D’Aunno (1986) mention the possibility of generating something like a community in the workplace. McMillan & Chavis (1986) emphasize the social aspects of community, that is, a feeling of belonging, a feeling that members matter to one another, the sense that they matter to the group in general, and a shared faith that members’ needs will be met because of joint commitments. Later McMillan (1996) revised these components to include “a spirit of belonging together, a feeling that there is an authority structure that can be trusted, an awareness that trade and mutual benefit come from being together, and a spirit that comes from shared experiences that are preserved as art” (p. 315).
Wiesenfeld (1997) has reviewed many of the notions about community. She mentions Ferdinand Tonnies’ definition in 1887 of community as an amalgam of human beings that stay together (p. 10), incorporating the notions of community in an affective sense (Gemeinschaft) and “society” (Gesellschaft). This first notion of "community" can be associated with the ones that are based on the need for identity, cohesion and solidarity within a given group. The notion of “society” lacks this will for an essential human unity (We will deal with the need for organizational structure below).

These feelings of unity then can be contrasted with those that group members have in relation to the “Others” who may be threatening. This idea has a collective origin in which feelings within the group are considered to be reciprocal. Other notions related to community which were reviewed by Wiesenfeld (1997, p. 14-20) are:

a) Communities are the result of continuous social constructions, and are the result of members’ activities. The members are individuals who live and work together in a specific area, and help each other when necessary. This idea is related both to a construccionist theoretical viewpoint and the Hegelian - Marxist position that holds that collective practice produces people’s notions about the nature of community.
b) Communities develop out of the members’ individual identities which are then gradually incorporated into a collective social construction. Nevertheless, the members do not relinquish their individual status.
c) Group inter-subjectivity supposes the existence of a collective entity that then is interpreted in “reified” terms. That is, what was originally an idea becomes something concrete in the members’ minds.
d) The community is related to other groups such as the family and the workplace. Every individual has many memberships and multiple identities.
e) There will be dissident members that may generate creative changes in the group. Also, conflict is a part of community interaction.

These notions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In what we have just reviewed, we have considered community in a generic sense. It is important, also, to look for different kinds of community structures and analyze their significance for intervention efforts. In following section I will discuss briefly the following community models: a) the sense of community, b) the community considered from the point of view of political liberalism, and c) the community examined from the perspective of social justice and participation. I have chosen these models because they seem to represent opposing points of view. In the first case, a sense of community often arises “naturally” from a plurality of mutual, interpersonal associations. This “sense” can then be a topic for study by social scientists. On the other hand political liberalism and the idea of social justice and participation are more elaborate notions of community that members must reflect upon. (These notions are considered separately below.) There may be debate in community organizations about the adoption of one of these models. Thus, they often represent group achievements, in the sense of conscious, inter-subjective decisions about how community members would like to live.

The sense of community

Sarason (1974), Miller (1986), McMillan&Chavis (1986), McMillan (1996), Wiesenfeld (1997) and others have referred to the notion of “sense of community”. This notion is of importance for facilitators who are interested in community members’ self-realization within a “warm” social environment. A sense of community does not always develop when a territorial association occurs among people.

This “sense” is the product of the collective representations of community members. Wiesenfeld (1997, p. 10) has said that the essence of this notion is community members’ eagerness for a collective project defined as “we-ness”. She adds, however, that in a normative sense, this consolidated self should include a profound respect for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, even within conflictive situations. On the other hand McMillan (1996) mentions several authors that understand “community” in terms of the distinction between “us” and “them”, or in terms of the boundaries that establish who are the “outsiders”. In the same tone, Hernández (1998) points out that this sense can be appreciated in two phrases: a) This is our space, and b) We are not alone.

Almost all communities have a shared tradition. Although a sense of community normally contains a people’s social roots, some communities define themselves almost exclusively in ethnic or mythical terms. There are many classical examples, Islamic fundamentalism, Zionism, Haiti’s Negritude in the first years of “Papa Doc’s” regime, and the separatist movements in many parts of the world. The everyday examples can be found in the small communities where everyone knows everybody else, or ethnically identified neighborhood settings (for example, indigenous communities, the “Little Italy” neighborhoods, or the “Latino” communities in Miami or California).

Part of the expression of a sense of community can be found in the communities’ historical identities (Gómez, 1997; Giuliani, 1997). Sometimes these historical identities include semi mythical ideas about the communities’ heroic or fantastic origins (for example, the history of the Founding Fathers). However, historical origins may also include hidden, self-defeating elements such as when members internalize racial or ethnic prejudice that has originated outside the community. Thus, Afro-americans (I understand “Americans” in the larger, Pan American sense), Native Americans, new immigrant populations, or other discriminated groups may have negative self images which they may generalize to the entire community. This adoption of unpleasant external evaluations as valid criteria for a sense of the self is akin to Hegel’s slave’s belief that he is “only a thing”.

In this sense CSP facilitators may use the community’s sense of itself to help the members define (or redefine) themselves. The cohesive feelings that result from a critical awareness of “weness” can become a springboard to the generation of joint projects. It might be said in such a case that the participants’ “lifeworld” becomes enlarged through social participation, or that self reflection may produce the capacity for personal agency as was described in “Hegel’s slave”. Almeida (1997) has described the growth and development of a group of social activists in Mexico that lived and worked in and near the town of Puebla for more than 20 years. This is the description of the conformation and maintenance of a sort of community life in which the growth of a sense of agency among the members became one of its main characteristics.

This community model represents a source from which “naturally occurring” ideas of community can develop. Individual self-fulfillment, which has been a traditional concern of psychologists, is seen as a possible collective achievement, that is, a sort of a by-product of successful inter-subjectivity.

The community as an institution considered from the point of view of political liberalism
Political liberalism is aimed at the “rationalization” of social interaction and inter-subjectivity. The model usually does not spring from community members’ self awareness, and thus has to be taught by facilitators who perceive the need for mediating institutions. Most modern democracies are based on this notion of social organization. It was an "invention" of the XVIII Century, but its roots can be traced back to the V Century BC in Athens, and much later to the Carta Magna, the origin of which tradition places in Runnymede, England, June 15th,, 1215 AD. Among the rules that define this model we can identify:

a) The individual in this model is subordinated to a system of rules and roles that makes him or her lawfully equal to his or her fellow citizens.
b) The majority decides, but often there are provisions for the protection of minorities.
c) Political liberalism is based on the individual’s choice (through the vote) and collective control.
d) Conflict is expected, but institutional mechanisms are provided for resolving problems.
e) Personal relationships are carefully distinguished from institutional ones. Thus institutional roles may exist side by side with family ties and friendships.

Cronick (1988) has suggested that there are three components that make up community change, that is personal, technological and civic changes. She points out that the generation of civic institutional change may lead to both personal growth and instrumental improvements in communities. Disorganized and passive community members may thus find sufficient structure for carrying out complex projects. In this way, it is important to establish both community associations with formal rules for decision making, and elected officials that can represent the community in relation to city government and other institutions.

An example of this kind of intervention in Caracas, Venezuela, can be found in the facilitation model of a group of promoters called the Popular Home Foundation (Fundación de la Vivienda Popular - FVP). Promoters offer low-interest loans for community or home improvement projects. (Ordinary bank loans may charge more than 50% interest rates.) However, in order to receive these loans, the communities are required to create legally constituted neighborhood associations that will be responsible to the FVP. All negotiation is carried out between the association and the FVP. This association decides which improvements will be undertaken, and these may include the enlargement of individual homes or collective projects such as the construction of a community meeting-house.

Members are taught how to separate friendships from role obligations, and thus the elected officials are shown the need to treat relatives, friends and acquaintances on an institutional basis. This means that the treasurer must make his or her relatives pay their debts just as the other members do. This kind of role model often represents a new way of interacting, because personal ties often have been privileged over other relationships. As a result of this kind of project, the physical aspects of the community are improved and the institutional infrastructure remains as an instrument for the achievement of future activities.

The community examined from the perspective of social justice and participation
This model can be traced back to Rousseau, Marx, Feuerbach, and other reformists and social activists who believed that a broadening of democracy is not enough. It is also necessary to achieve an emancipatory change in which certain egalitarian values are added to the sense of community, the individual responsibility, and functional interdependence found in the previous models. It includes a normative structure that imposes the requirement to help or take care of those who have special needs (or social structuring that gives people the right to equality). The creation of social services, free clinics, special architectural features for disabled people, and safe houses for battered women and children belong in this category.

In the course of his or her lifetime, any community member may require assistance of one kind or another. The need for special attention for certain minority groups (children, blind or deaf people, certain underprivileged ethnic groups, etc.) may imply the existence of legal loopholes which community members may try to fill by recourse to city or central government offices. In some cases, people may form interest groups and campaign for additional public services, such as increased pensions for the elderly, funds for the prevention of a particular disease or the protection of endangered species. That is, when certain rights to wellbeing go unrecognized by the state, then it becomes necessary to organize special efforts to protect those who have not been able to help themselves. These efforts may take the form of new government services such as additional social security systems, but as García (1992) has observed, these services cannot substitute day-by-day community solidarity.

To develop this model in terms of a local neighborhood, I will describe an example of its use in Caracas (Jiménez, Medina & Romero, 1999; León y Montenegro, 1999; Leon, Montenegro, Ramdjan & Villarte, 1997; Villarte, 1993). A school (called the “Children’s Club”) in the “Niño Jesus” neighborhood of Caracas was established as result of a reading-group organized by the National Library of Venezuela for stimulating reading skills. Several groups of facilitators worked in the project, a professional facilitating group called Maizal and students in consecutive courses of the “Psychosocial Intervention” Graduate Program at the Central University of Venezuela. As a result, some of the members of this community became interested in helping children who, for different reasons, are excluded from the public school system.

The community members who became interested in doing something about this problem in their neighborhood began to give informal classes to a small group of children. Later they obtained funds from sources such as a European embassy and a foundation, and they built and equipped a small school. They also obtained some teacher training, and have had over a hundred children enrolled at a time (at the present time there are 60 -Susana Medina, personal communication). The school is still unrecognized by the Ministry of Education, but the teaching is so good that some parents have tried to take their children out of the public school system in order to benefit from the program.

The women who worried about the unschooled children in their community were able to think of these children as needful. They were able to see their own ability to help out. These women were not solving their own problems, although they certainly grew personally in the group experience. They were able to perceive someone else’s stressful situation, perhaps by generalizing their own roles as mothers.

One of the interesting features of this model is the satisfaction and sense of meaning that the “helpers” obtain from their participation in this kind of project. Although many of the tasks involved are tedious, and disappointments often outnumber achievements, participants may resist closing the projects, largely because of these satisfactions. The Children’s Club project has floundered several times due to the difficulties involved, but the organizers have always returned to “try again”. For an example of this kind of resistance in the United States we can mention how some decades ago infantile paralysis (polio) was a major health threat. Several fund raising groups were active in ameliorating this problem. After vaccines were developed to lessen the risk of contagion, these fund-raisers turned their attention and organizational capacities toward other “good causes” instead of ending their activities.

A FINAL REFLECTION

This paper has attempted to add to community psychology’s reflections about the nature of subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and community because facilitators who use CSP are often caught between:

a) the active promotion of specific models and ideologies for social change,
b) the generation of social change through the “problematization” of participants’ goals, values, awareness, social representations, and constructions.

“Problematization” comes from “problemize”, a facilitation technique developed by Paulo Freire (1972, 1978). It has to do with a quasi Socratic questioning of participants’ knowledge of themselves and their community. The object is to allow participants to consider their knowledge as “valid”, or at least as valid as more “orthodox” or dominant ways of viewing the world. This procedure also aims at the questioning of uncritically held notions.

These activities are tied to facilitators’ different roles, among which can be mentioned those of a good listener, an educator, an organizer, and a raiser of consciousness. The facilitator’s chief role, however is that of “promoter of social action”, which can be defined as the use of a social network which enables community members to change certain individual and collective aspects of their lives (Hernández, 1998). In another context, Sawaia (1998, p. 179) mentions facilitation as "the search for socialization spaces in order to overcome 'psycho-social suffering'." In order to do this, all the participants must have an idea of the possibilities open to them.

In Latin American CSP, theory is usually generated from the practice of facilitating community change. We can mention models in which this dependence is mediated by complex facilitation activities:

a) Sawaia (1998), for example, shows how the need to develop an ethical facilitation stance on the basis of everyday and local experiences has become important since the last decade of the 20th Century. Praxis, in this context, is an important source of awareness. The facilitator also participates with community members in a constant "recreation of collective existence, a permanent flow of experiences which are seen as reality by the individual person but are likewise shared by the collectivity" (p. 182).

b) In another approach, Giuliani (1997) proposes the use of the historical reconstruction of communities in which the systematic devolution of the participants' discourse becomes a medium for "the joint generation of experiences and awareness by both external agents and communities" (p. 39).

c) An important expression of the facilitation approach that employs cycles of praxis and reflection is generally known as “participatory – action - research” (which originated in the work of Fals Borda, 1959, 1978, 1979, and has continued with the work of his followers, for example Salazar, 1992).

Practice (praxis) is a resource in community facilitation which has the advantage of respecting participants’ experience and ideas, and it avoids imposing aspects of the “dominant culture” on minority groups. However, reliance on practice for the generation of theory may be a double-edged sword. The relation between inter-subjectivity and community may be impoverished because facilitators are unable to offer community members concepts that differ from their own immediate experience.

The ideological history of subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and community that has developed over the last two centuries is often ignored. This vacuum may result in “reinventing the wheel” in each case of community facilitation. And even worse, over-reliance on practice may cause community members and facilitators to generate non-productive models such as overly authoritarian social systems and groups based on the presence of rejected outsiders. Both of these errors have appeared in some work that has been done with “street children” in Caracas. (Llorens, 1999; D. Nogueira, personal communication, 1999). For example, in an experience evaluated by Nogueira, which has to do with directed sports activities for this population, there have been cases in which staff members and volunteers have been abruptly eliminated from the program, and other people have been denied access to the locale. Another undesired effect of the generation of poorly elaborated community inter-subjectivity may be the dissolution of community awareness because individuals limit their efforts to the search for personal self-fulfillment (as seems to be the final result of the group described by Almeida, 1997). Also, psychology has concentrated on the isolated individual rather than his or her capacity for relationships.

The community is the stage on which inter-subjectivity is played out, but not all community models predict the same attributes for the subjects that make them up or the processes these people live through. It may be that a systematic exploration of subjectivity, inter-subjectivity and community models is the next major task for CSP. These models often lead to specific ideas about subjectivity and community, and they may have a great deal to do with participant satisfaction. As Sarason (1986) has said, “By virtue of its mental health focus, community psychology never has been forced to reflect on what is meant by ‘community.’… It was, and still largely is, a hodge podge.” This is still true of psychology as a discipline which has often avoided this kind of confrontation.

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